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This dissertation deals with the study of non-cooperative differential games with pure
state constraints. We propose a first order optimality result for the open-loop Nash
and Stackelberg equilibriums solutions of an N -player differential game with pure state
constraints. A numerical method to solve for an open-loop Nash equilibrium is discussed.
Numerical examples are included to illustrate this method.
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This dissertation deals with the study of differential games with pure state constraints.
The theory of a differential game is concerned with multiple player decision making.
A differential game comprises of, a dynamic decision process changing continuously in
time, the players, their respective payoff (cost) functions and the information that the
players may have access to.
Differential game theory can be considered as an extension of optimal control theory
[1]. Optimal control theory is concerned with the optimization of a single objective
function for one control variable only, whereas in an N -player differential game each
player optimizes his own payoff function subject to the dynamics of the game which is
given by a differential equation.
The study of differential games was first introduced by Isaacs [2] in 1954. In the early
development of the theory, applications of pursuit-evasion type problems were popu-
lar. In the 1970’s, an interest in the applications of differential games in economics
developed. Differential game theory has since been applied to a large array of topics in
economics, such as macroeconomics, microeconomics, industrial organization, oligopoly
theory, resource and environmental economics, labour economics, marketing, produc-
tion, and operations management, finance, and much more [3–6].
Primarily, the importance of differential games lies in military type applications such
as, missile guidance, aircraft controls and aerial tactics [7]. A lot of research has been
done on the application of differential games in warfare and pursuit [2, 8, 9].
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Noteworthy pioneers in the development of differential game theory include Friedman
[10], Başar and Olsder [11], Fudenberg and Tirole [12]. Most of this literature shows us
that differential games started off as an extension of optimal control theory [13]. The
connection between differential game theory and optimal control theory was clarified by
the study of the Maximum Principle [1].
Recently, most research on the topic of differential games has focused on the case of
N -player differential games with cooperation [14] and stochastic differential games [3].
Advances in mathematical computational tools have led to the study of numerical meth-
ods of differential games [15, 16]. The aim of this dissertation is to solve for the Nash
and Stackelberg equilibriums solutions of a differential game with pure state constraints
by using an application of the Maximum Principle.
A brief overview of the Chapters is as follows.
In Chapter 2, we review the concepts of constrained optimal control and optimization
problems. In Section 2.1 we introduce the Maximum Principle for an optimal control
problem with general inequality constraints. We then discuss the Maximum Principle
for current value problems. We then move on to Section 2.2, here we discuss sufficiency
conditions for optimal control problems. In Section 2.3 we describe the numerical method
known as the Forward-Backward Sweep to solve optimal control problems. We conclude
the section with some examples. Finally in Section 2.4 we discuss the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for optimization problems with constraints.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the theories of N -player differential games. We begin
with a brief review of game theory and then move on to describe the theories of an
N -player differential game with pure state constraints. Here we illustrate how we can
use the maximum principle to obtain necessary conditions for the open-loop Nash and
Stackelberg equilibriums. The section is concluded with some examples to illustrate
these notions.
In Chapter 4, we investigate numerical methods to solve for an open-loop Nash equi-
librium. An algorithm for solving N -player differential games with the Hamiltonian
being a convex function to the control is described. The section is concluded with some
examples to illustrate this method. The chapter is concluded with some examples.
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In Chapter 5, we present the conclusion of the dissertation. Here we discuss the short-
comings of the N- player differential game problem. We then discuss how we may
improve the problem and the approach to solving it. We end the chapter by discussing
the agenda for future research of the problem.
Chapter 2
Overview of Constrained Optimal
Control Theory and Optimization
This chapter deals with the theory and the numerical simulation of constrained optimal
control and optimization problems. These concepts play an important role in the study
of differential games which is the main topic of this dissertation.
2.1 Optimal Control Problems with General Inequality
Constraints
We consider the constrained optimal control problem formulated as
max
{
J = S(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
F (t, x(t), u(t))dt
}
, (2.1)
subject to ẋ = f(t, x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0, (2.2)
g(t, x(t), u(t) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.3)
h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.4)
where, x(t) : [0, T ] → Rn is called the state variable, u(t) : [0, T ] → Rm is called
the control variable, the function f : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm 7→ Rn in (2.2) describes the
dynamical system and the integrand of the integral, F : [0, T ]× Rn × Rm 7→ R, in (2.1)
is called the running payoff. The function S : R × Rn 7→ R in (2.1) is called terminal
payoff. The functions g : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm 7→ Rq is a mixed inequality constraint and
4
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h : [0, T ] × Rn 7→ Rr is a pure state constraint. We assume that the functions g, h, f ,
F and S are continuously differentiable in all their arguments.
Definition 2.1.1 (Admissible Control). A control u which satisfies the equations (2.2)
and (2.3) is called an admissible control.
For simplicity, we assume that the function h has only one component, that is r = 1.
At any point where h(t, x(t)) > 0, the corresponding constraint h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0 is not
binding and can be ignored. Otherwise at any interval where h(t, x(t)) = 0, we require
the total derivative of the function h(t, x(t)) with respect to time, denoted as ḣ(t, x(t))
to be positive in order for h(t, x(t)) to remain positive. The total time derivatives of the
function h(t, x(t)) can be worked out as follows
ḣ(t, x, u) =
d
dt
h(t, x) = ht + hxẋ
= ht + hxf,
(2.5)
and
ḧ(t, x, u) =
d2
dt2
h(t, x) = hx (u̇fu + ẋfx + ft) + f (ẋhxx + hxt) + ẋhxt + htt
= hx (u̇fu + ffx + ft) + f
2hxx + 2fhxt + htt.
Definition 2.1.2 (Order of State Constraint). Let h(t, x(t)) : Rn × R → Rr be r ∈ N
times continuously differentiable. The state constraint h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0 is said to be of
jth order if the first time that the control u appears explicitly in the total derivative of
h(t, x(t)) with respect to t is at the jth derivative.
For simplicity, we will consider in the rest of this chapter only pure state constraints of
order one.
Definition 2.1.3 (Interior Interval, Boundary Interval, Junction Times). With regards
to the constraint h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0 we have the following,
1. We call the interval (θ1, θ2) ⊂ [0, T ] an interior interval if for the constraint
h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0 we have h(t, x(t)) > 0 for all t ∈ (θ1, θ2) with θ1 < θ2.
2. We call the interval [τ1, τ2] the boundary interval if the optimal trajectory satisfies
h(t, x(t)) = 0 for τ1 < t < τ2.
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3. Collectively (i) - (iii) given below are known as the junction times of the interval.
(i) If at t = τ1 we have the end of interior interval and the start of a boundary
interval, then τ1 is called an entry time.
(ii) If at τ2 we have the end of boundary interval and the start of a interior
interval, then τ2 is called an exit time.
(iii) If h(τ, x(τ)) = 0 and if the trajectory is in the interior just before and after
τ , then τ is known as a contact time.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of Interior Interval, Boundary Interval, Junction Times
Figure 2.1 presents an illustration of the interior interval, boundary interval, and junction
times as described in Definition 2.1.3.
For the rest of this chapter, we require that the mixed inequality constraints g satisfy
the constraint qualifications
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for ḣ as defined in equation (2.5).
The condition (2.6) indicates that the gradients of all the constraints g with respect to
u has to be linearly independent.
A first order optimality condition for the OCP (2.1)-(2.4) is now presented. The Hamil-
tonian allows us to handle the constraints (2.2) through a multiplier p. The Lagrangian
allows us to handle the mixed inequality constraints (2.3) through a multiplier η and
the pure state constraints (2.4) through a multiplier µ. In practice there are two main
ways to handle pure state constraints namely, the direct and indirect adjoining methods.
In the direct adjoining method, the pure state constraints (2.4) is used directly to form
the Lagrangian via a multiplier whereas in the indirected adjoining method , the total
derivative of the pure state constraints (2.5) is used to form the Lagrangian when the
constraints (2.4) are biding.
The Hamiltonian function H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rm × Rn → R is given by,
H[t, x, u, p] = F (t, x, u) + p · f(t, x, u), (2.8)
where p is a row vector called the adjoint or co-state variable.
The Lagrangian function L : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rn × Rq × Rr → R using the indirect
adjoining method is given by,
L[t, x, u, p, η, µ] := H(t, x, u, p) + η · g(t, x, u) + µ · ḣ(t, x, u). (2.9)
We are now ready to state the necessary conditions for the maximum principle with
general inequality constraints for problem (2.1)-(2.4).
Theorem 2.1.4 (Maximum Principle with General Inequality Constraints). Let the
control u∗ with corresponding state trajectory x∗ be an optimal solution for the problem
(2.1)-(2.4) satisfying the constraint qualifications (2.6)-(2.7). Then there exists adjoint
variable p, multipliers η, µ, γ and the jump parameter ζ satisfying the following conditions
(i)-(vi) at every time where u∗ is continuous,
(i) The state equation
ẋ∗ = f(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)), x∗(0) = x0, (2.10)
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is satisfied together with the constraints
g(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)) ≥ 0 and h(t, x∗(t)) ≥ 0. (2.11)




with the transversality conditions
p(T−) = Sx(T, x
∗(T )) + γhx(T, x
∗(T )),
γ ≥ 0, γ h(T, x∗(T )) = 0.
(2.13)
(iii) The Hamiltonian maximizing condition given by,
H(t, x∗(t), u∗(t), p(t)) ≥ H(t, x∗(t), u, p(t)), (2.14)
for each t ∈ [0, T ] for all u which satisfy
g[t, x∗(t), u(t)] ≥ 0, and
ḣ[t, x∗(t), u(t)] ≥ 0 whenever h(t, x∗(t)) = 0.
(2.15)
(iv) The jump conditions at any entry/contact time τ are
p(τ−) = p(τ+) + ζ(τ)hx(τ, x
∗(τ)) and
H(τ, x∗(τ), u∗(τ−), p(τ−)) = H(τ, x∗(τ), u∗(τ+), p(τ+))− ζ(τ)ht(τ, x∗(τ))
(2.16)













(vi) The complementary slackness conditions
η(t) ≥ 0, η(t) g(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)) = 0,
µ(t) ≥ 0, µ(t) h(t, x∗(t)) = 0, µ̇(t) ≤ 0,
ζ(τ) ≥ 0, ζ(τ)h(τ, x∗(τ)) = 0.
(2.18)
hold.
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In the case where the terminal time T is unspecified, we have an extra necessary transver-
sality condition for T ∗ to be optimal which is,
H(T ∗, x∗(T ∗), u∗(T ∗), p(T ∗)) + ST (T
∗, x∗(T ∗)) = 0, (2.19)
as long as T ∗ ∈ (0,∞). It is important to note that if T is confined to an interval [τa, τb],
where τb > τa ≥ 0, then we still use the additional tranversality condition (2.19) given
that T ∗ ∈ (τa, τb). Now when we have the case where T ∗ = τa, we will simply substitute
the equality sign of the additional tranversality condition (2.19) with ≤ and for the case
where T ∗ = τb, we substitute the equality sign of the additional tranversality condition
(2.19) with ≥.
Example 2.1.1. Consider an economy consisting of two sectors where, sector 1 produces
investment goods and sector 2 produces consumption goods. Let
xi(t) = the production in sector i per unit of time, i = 1, 2,
and let
u(t) = the proportion of investments allocated to sector 1
where
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ 1
The increase in production per unit of time in each sector is assumed to be proportional
to investment allocated to the sector hence, we have the following system with dynamics
ẋ1(t) = αux1 x1(0) = x10,
ẋ2(t) = α(1− u)x1, x2(0) = x20,
t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.20)
where α is a positive constant.





We aim to maximize the total consumption in the given planning period [0, T ].
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Solution. The Hamiltonian for the problem is given as
H[t, x1, x2, u, p1, p2] = F (t, x1, x2, u) + p1 · f1(t, x1, x2, u) + p2 · f2(t, x1, x2, u)
= x2 + p1 · (αux1) + p2 · (α(1− u)x1) ,
(2.22)
Applying the Hamiltonian maximization condition (iii) of Theorem (2.1.4) we get
u] = argmax
u∈U
{H[t, x1, x2, u, p1, p2]}
= argmax
u∈U
{x2 + p1 · (αux1) + p2 · (α(1− u)x1)}
= argmax
u∈U
{αux1 (p1 − p2)}
=
 1 if p1 − p2 > 0,0 if p1 − p2 < 0.
(2.23)






{x2 + p1 · (αux1) + p2 · (α(1− u)x1)}







{x2 + p1 · (αux1) + p2 · (α(1− u)x1)}
= −1,
with the transversality conditions
p1(T ) = Sx1(T, x1(T )) = 0,
and
p2(T ) = Sx2(T, x2(T )) = 0.
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Putting all together gives
u] =
 1 if p1 − p2 > 0,0 if p1 − p2 < 0.
ẋ1 = αu
]x1, x1(0) = x10,
ẋ2 = α(1− u])x1, x2(0) = x20,
ṗ1 = −p1αu− p2α(1− u), p1(T ) = 0,




 1 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,0 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
x∗1 =
 x10eαt if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,x10eαT−2 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
x∗2 =
 x20 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,x20 + αx10(t− T + 2α)eαT−2 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
p∗1 =
 2αe(−αt+αT−2) if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,α
2 (t− T )
2 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
p∗2 = T − t.

Example 2.1.2 (Price of Goods). We consider a firm manufacturing a good where,
x(t) = the sale price of a good at time t,
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and for the controls, at each time t, a good is produced by the firm. So the controls for
our problem are defined as:
u(t) = rate of production of a good at time t,
and
d = rate of consumption of a good at time t,
c(s) = cost function,





The price increases when the consumption of goods is larger than the production of goods,
and decreases otherwise. That is we have the following system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = x(t)(d− u(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ],
We have constraints given by
x(t) ≥ 0. (2.25)
The payoff functional is measured by the profit generated by sales, minus the cost c(u(t))




[d · x(t)− c(u(t))] dt.
We aim to find an optimal solution for the problem.
Solution. The Hamiltonian for the problem is given as
H[t, x, u, p] = F (t, x, u) + p · f(t, x, u)
= d · x− u
2
2
+ p · x(d− u),
(2.26)
Chapter 2. An overview of constrained optimal control theory and optimization 13
and the Lagrangian for the problem is given as
L[t, x, u, p, µ] = H[t, x, u, p] + µ · f(t, x, u)
= d · x− u
2
2
+ p · x(d− u) + µ · x(d− u).
Applying the Hamiltonian maximization condition (iii) of Theorem (2.1.4) we get
u] = argmax
u∈U




d · x− u
2
2
+ p · x(d− u)
}
= −p · x,
(2.27)
for each t ∈ [0, T ] and for all u which satisfy
x(d− u) ≥ 0.






d · x− u
2
2
+ p · x(d− u) + µ · x(d− u)
}
= −d− (p+ µ) · (d− u),
with the transversality conditions
p(T ) = Sx(T, x(T )) + γhx(T, x(T ))
= γ
γ ≥ 0, γ x(T ) = 0.
From condition (vi) of Theorem (2.1.4) we find that the complementary slackness con-
ditions,
µ ≥ 0, µ x = 0, µ̇ ≤ 0.
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Putting all together gives

ẋ = x(d− u])
= x(d+ px), x(0) = x0,
ṗ = −d− (p+ µ) · (d− u]), p(T ) = γ,
= −d− (p+ µ) · (d+ px), γ ≥ 0, γ x(T ) = 0.
(2.28)
which satisfy the constraints
x(d− u) ≥ 0, (2.29)
and the slackness conditions
µ ≥ 0, µ x = 0, µ̇ ≤ 0. (2.30)
to determine the state x and the adjoint variable p.

Example 2.1.3 (Commodity Trading). Let
x1(t) = the money on hand at time t,
x2(t) = the amount of wheat owned at time t,
and for the controls, at each time t, we have the possibility to buy or to sell some wheat.
So the controls for our problem are defined as:
u(t) = amount of wheat bought/sold at time t,
where u(t) > 0 means we are buying wheat u(t) < 0 means we are selling wheat. Also
s = cost of storing a unit of amount of wheat for a unit of time,
q = price of wheat at time t,
where s > 0.
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We have the following system with dynamics
ẋ1(t) = −s · x2(t)− q(t) · u(t), x1(0) = x10,
ẋ2(t) = u(t), x2(0) = x20,
t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.31)
We have constraints given by
x1(t) ≥ 0,
x2(t) ≥ 0,
−4 ≤ u(t) ≤ 4.
(2.32)
The payoff functional for the firm is given as
J = [x1(T ) + q(T ) · x2(T )] ,
We aim to find an optimal solution for the problem.
Solution. In order to solve the problem, let us consider a particular situation, i.e
s = 3, and q(t) = t2 + 1,
The Hamiltonian for the problem is given as





+ p2 · u,
(2.33)
and the Lagrangian for the problem is given as
L[t, x1, x2, u, p1, p2, µ1, µ2] = H[t, x1, x2, u, p1, p2] + µ1 · f1(t, x1, x2, u) + µ2 · f2(t, x1, x2, u)




+ (p2 + µ2) · u.
Applying the Hamiltonian maximization condition (iii) of Theorem (2.1.4) we get
u] = argmax
u∈U












4 if p2 + p1 − p1t2 > 0,
0 if p2 + p1 − p1t2 = 0,
−4 if p2 + p1 − p1t2 < 0.
(2.34)
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for each t ∈ [0, T ] and for all u which satisfy
u− t2u− 3x2 ≥ 0, u ≥ 0.

























+ (p2 + µ2) · u
}
= 3 (p1 + µ1) ,
with the transversality conditions
p1(T ) = Sx1(T, x1(T )) + γ1h1x1(T, x1(T ))
= 1 + γ1,
γ1 ≥ 0, γ1 x1(T ) = 0,
and
p2(T ) = Sx2(T, x2(T )) + γ2h2x2(T, x2(T ))
= T 2 + 1 + γ2,
γ2 ≥ 0, γ2 x2(T ) = 0.
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+ (p2 + µ2) > 0,




+ (p2 + µ2) = 0,




+ (p2 + µ2) < 0.
(2.35)
From condition (vi) of Theorem (2.1.4) we find that the complementary slackness con-
ditions,
µ1 ≥ 0, µ1 x1 = 0, µ̇1 ≤ 0,
µ2 ≥ 0, µ2 x2 = 0, µ̇2 ≤ 0.
Putting all together gives




· u], x1(0) = x10,
ẋ2 = u
], x2(0) = x20
ṗ1 = 0, p1(T ) = 1 + γ1,
γ1 ≥ 0, γ1 x1(T ) = 0,
ṗ2 = 3 (p1 + µ1) , p2(T ) = T
2 + 1 + γ2.
γ2 ≥ 0, γ2 x2(T ) = 0.
(2.36)
which satisfy the constraints
u− t2u− 3x2 ≥ 0, u ≥ 0, (2.37)
and the slackness conditions
µ1 ≥ 0, µ1 x1 = 0, µ̇1 ≤ 0,
µ2 ≥ 0, µ2 x2 = 0, µ̇2 ≤ 0,
(2.38)
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to determine the states x1, x2 and the adjoint variables p1, p2.

2.1.1 Current-Value Formulation
When the running payoff is discounted, we can still write the maximum principle in the
usual form using the current value formulation of the problem.
maximize
{
J = e−rTS(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
e−rtF (t, x(t), u(t))dt
}
,
subject to ẋ = f(t, x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ],
(2.39)
g(t, x(t), u(t)) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.40)
h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.41)
The term e−rt is the discount factor and r > 0 is called the discount rate.
The standard Lagrangian function for problem (2.39)-(2.41) is given as,
L(t, x, u, p, µ) = H(t, x, u, p) + η · g(t, x, u) + µ · ḣ(t, x, u),
= e−rtF (t, x, u) + p · f(t, x, u) + η · g(t, x, u) + µ · ḣ(t, x, u),
where ḣ(t, x, u) is defined as in (2.5). If we multiply this Lagrangian by ert we will obtain
the current value Lagrangian function which is given as,
Lc = Lert = F (t, x, u) + p · ertf(t, x, u) + η · ertg(t, x, u) + µ · ertḣ(t, x, u)
= F (t, x, u) + λf(t, x, u) + ϕ · g(t, x, u) + ν · ḣ(t, x, u)
= Hc(t, x, u, λ) + ϕ · g(t, x, u) + ν · ḣ(t, x, u)
where λ = p · ert, ϕ = ertη, ν = ertµ and the
Hc(t, x, u, λ) = F (t, x, u) + p · ertf(t, x, u)
is the current value Hamiltonian function.
From λ = p · ert it follows that,
λ̇ = rλ+ ertṗ. (2.42)
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From (2.42) and (2.43) we see that the adjoint equation will take on the form,
λ̇− rλ = −∂L
c
∂x
with the corresponding current value transversality condition given by
λ(T ) = erT p(T )
= Sx(T, x
∗(T )) + erTγhx(T, x
∗(T ))
= Sx(T, x
∗(T )) + δhx(T, x
∗(T )),
where δ = erTγ.
We are now ready to state the maximum principle for problem (2.39)-(2.41).
Theorem 2.1.5 (Maximum Principle with General Inequality Constraints). Let the
control u∗ with corresponding state trajectory x∗ be an optimal solution for the problem
(2.39)-(2.41) satisfying the constraint qualifications (2.6)-(2.7). Then there exists an
adjoint variable λ, multipliers ϕ, ν, δ and the jump parameter ζ satisfying the following
conditions (i)-(vi) at every time where u∗ is continuous,
(i) The state equation
ẋ∗ = f(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)), x∗(0) = x0, (2.44)
is satisfied together with the constraints
g(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)) ≥ 0 and h(t, x∗(t)) ≥ 0. (2.45)
(ii) The adjoint equation given by
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with the transversality conditions
λ(T−) = Sx(T, x
∗(T )) + δhx(T, x
∗(T )),
δ ≥ 0, δ h(T, x∗(T )) = 0.
(2.47)
(iii) The Hamiltonian maximizing condition given by
Hc(t, x∗(t), u∗(t), λ(t)) ≥ Hc(t, x∗(t), u, λ(t)), (2.48)
for each t ∈ [0, T ] for all u which satisfy
g[t, x∗(t), u(t)] ≥ 0, and
ḣ[t, x∗(t), u(t)] ≥ 0 whenever h(t, x∗(t)) = 0.
(2.49)
(iv) The jump conditions at any entry/contact time τ are
λ(τ−) = λ(τ+) + ζ(τ)hx(τ, x
∗(τ)) and
Hc(τ, x∗(τ), u∗(τ−), λ(τ−)) = Hc(τ, x∗(τ), u∗(τ+), λ(τ+))− ζ(τ)ht(τ, x∗(τ)).
(2.50)













(vi) The complementary slackness conditions
ϕ(t) ≥ 0, ϕ(t) g(t, x∗(t), u∗(t)) = 0,
ν(t) ≥ 0, ν(t) h(t, x∗(t)) = 0, ν̇(t) ≤ rν(t),
ζ(τ) ≥ 0, ζ(τ)h(τ, x∗(τ)) = 0.
(2.52)
hold.
Example 2.1.4 (Vidale-Wolfe Advertising Model). We consider a firm wanting to in-
crease their total number customers through advertising. Let
x(t) = market share of the firm at time t,
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and for the controls, at each time t, an advertising strategy is implemented by the firm.
So the controls for our problem are defined as:
u(t) = advertising effort of the firm at time t,
and
r = interest rate,
φ = Firm’s fractional revenue potential,
c(s) = advertising cost function





where k is a positive constant.
The number of customers at the firm is the difference between the number of customers
attracted to the firm and the number of customers repelled from the firm, hence we have
the following system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = u(t)(1− x(t))− x(t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.53)
We have constraints given by
0 ≤ x(t) ≤ 1. (2.54)




e−rt [φ · x(t)− c(u(t))] dt,
We aim to find an optimal solution for the problem.
Solution. The Hamiltonian for the problem is given as
Hc[t, x, u, λ] = F (t, x, u) + λ · f(t, x, u)
= φ · x− ku
2
2
+ λ · (u(1− x)− x) ,
(2.55)
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and the Lagrangian for the problem is given as
Lc[t, x, u, λ, ν] = Hc[t, x, u, λ] + ν1 · f(t, x, u)− ν2 · f(t, x, u)
= φ · x− ku
2
2
+ (λ+ ν) · (u(1− x)− x) ,
where ν = ν1 − ν2 and Hc[t, x, u, λ] is defined as in (2.55).
Applying the Hamiltonian maximization condition (iii) of Theorem (2.1.5) we get
u] = argmax
u∈U




φ · x− ku
2
2
+ λ · (u(1− x)− x)
}
=
λ · (1− x)
k
,
for each t ∈ [0, T ] for all u which satisfy
u(1− x)− x ≥ 0,
x− u(1− x) ≥ 0.
From condition (ii) of Theorem (2.1.5) we find that the adjoint equation is given by,






φ · x− ku
2
2
+ (λ+ ν) · (u(1− x)− x)
}
= −φ+ (λ+ ν) (u+ 1) ,
along with the transversality conditions
λ(T ) = Sx(T, x(T )) + δ1∇xh1(T, x(T )) + δ2∇xh2(T, x(T )),
= δ1 − δ2
δ1 ≥ 0, δ1 x(T ) = 0
δ2 ≥ 0, δ2 (1− x(T )) = 0.
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φ · x− ku
2
2
+ (λ+ ν) · (u(1− x)− x)
}
=
(λ+ ν) · (1− x)
k
From condition (vi) of Theorem (2.1.5) we find that the complementary slackness con-
ditions,
ν1(t) ≥ 0, ν1(t) x(t) = 0, ν̇1(t) ≤ 0,
ν2(t) ≥ 0, ν2(t) (1− x(t)) = 0, ν̇2(t) ≤ 0.
Putting all together gives
ẋ = u](1− x)− x, x(0) = x0,
=
λ · (1− x)2
k
− x




= −φ+ (λ+ ν)
(




, λ(T ) = δ1 − δ2,
δ1 x(T ) = 0, δ1 ≥ 0,
δ2 (1− x(T )) = 0, δ2 ≥ 0.
(2.56)
where, ν = ν1 − ν2, satisfying the constraints
u(1− x)− x ≥ 0,
x− u(1− x) ≥ 0.
(2.57)
and the slackness conditions ν1(t) ≥ 0, ν1(t) x(t) = 0, ν̇1(t) ≤ 0,ν2(t) ≥ 0, ν2(t) (1− x(t)) = 0, ν̇2(t) ≤ 0. (2.58)
to determine the state x and the adjoint variable λ.

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Remark 2.1.6. The system of ODE (2.56) - (2.58) is strongly coupled and therefore
difficult to solve analytically. In Section 2.3 we will propose a numerical method for its
solution.
2.2 Sufficiency Conditions for Optimal Control Problems
The maximum principle only provides necessary conditions for optimality, but it does
not ensure that the given solution is optimal and whether an optimal solution exists.
With some concavity conditions imposed on the Hamiltonian, the extremal provided by
the maximum principle can be proven to be an optimal solution of the problem.
Optimal control theory has two main types of sufficiency theorems which are known as
the Mangasarian and the Arrow theorems. Both of these theorems are important results
since many applications rely on them [20].
Before we state the sufficiency conditions for problem (2.39) - (2.41), we must introduce
the direct adjoining current value Hamiltonian function which is given by,
Hc
d
= Hert = F (t, x, u) + λ · ertf(t, x, u)
= F (t, x, u) + λd · f(t, x, u),
and the direct adjoing current value Lagrangian function which is given by,
Lc
d
= F (t, x, u) + pd · ertf(t, x, u) + ηd · ertg(t, x, u) + µd · erth(t, x)
= Hc
d
+ ϕd · g(t, x, u) + νd · h(t, x).
where λd = ertλ, νd = ertµd and ϕd = ertηd are multipliers in the direct formulation
which can be expressed in terms of the multipliers λ, ν and ϕ in the indirect formulation.
In order to formulate the sufficient conditions we need the following definition
λd(t) = λ(t) + ν(t)hx(t, x
∗(t)) and νd(t) = ν(t).
We will now state the Mangasarian sufficiency theorem for OCP (2.39) - (2.41) following
closely [21].
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Theorem 2.2.1 (Mangasarian Sufficiency Theorem). Let the control u∗ with corre-
sponding state trajectory x∗, the adjoint function λd, the function νd, ϕd, and the con-
stants δ and ζ satisfy all conditions (i)-(vi) of Theorem (2.1.5) and let λd(t) = λ(t) +
ν(t)hx(t, x
∗(t)). Suppose that the set U is convex for every x ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ], the partial
derivatives of the functions F (t, x, u) and f(t, x, u) are continuous with respect to their
arguments. If the Hamiltonian function Hc
d
(t, x, u, λd) exists and is concave in (x, u)
for all t, the terminal payoff S(T, x) is concave in x, g(t, x, u) is quasiconcave in (x, u)
and the function h(t, x) is quasiconcave in x, then (x∗, u∗) is an optimal solution.
Furthermore if the Hamiltonian function Hc
d
(t, x, u, λd) is strictly concave in (x, u) for
all t, then the optimal solution (x∗, u∗) is unique.
For most problems in optimal control theory sufficiency can be shown using the Man-
gasarian but there are many important problems in economics where we may find that
the Hamiltonian function is not concave, hence we need to weaken this concavity condi-
tion as suggested by Arrow [17]. In order to do this we first need to define the maximized
Hamiltonian function H] : Rn × Rm × R→ R given as,




(t, x, u, λd). (2.59)
Let us assume that the maximisation problem in equation (2.59), has a unique solution
denoted as u = u](t, x, λd). We can then write
H](t, x, u, λd) = Hc
d
(t, x, u], λd), (2.60)




x (t, x, u
], λd) +Hc
d






H]x(t, x, u, λ
d) = Hc
d
x (t, x, u
], λd), (2.62)
it is enough to prove that
H
cd
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for all x. To do this we must consider the two cases of: (i) the unconstrained global maxi-
mum of Hc
d
occurring in the interior of U(t). So for this case we have Hc
d
u (t, x, u
], p) = 0.
(ii) the unconstrained global maximum of Hc
d




= 0, since changing the state x does not effect the optimal value of the
control u. We have then proven (2.62).
Definition 2.2.2 (Quasi-concave). Consider the function f(x) defined on a convex
subset S ∈ Rn is said to be quasi-concave if for all real αinR, the set x ∈ S : f(x) ≥ α
is convex.
We will now state the Arrow sufficiency theorem for OCP (2.39) - (2.41) following closely
[21, 22].
Theorem 2.2.3 (Arrow Sufficiency Theorem). Let the control u∗ with corresponding
state trajectory x∗, the adjoint function λd, the function νd, ϕd, and the constants δ and
ζ satisfy all conditions (i)-(vi) of Theorem (2.1.5) and let λd(t) = λ(t)+ν(t)hx(t, x
∗(t)).
Suppose that the set U is convex for every x ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ], the partial derivatives of
the functions F (t, x, u) and f(t, x, u) are continuous with respect to their arguments. If
the Hamiltonian function H](t, x, u, λd) defined in (2.59) exists and is concave in x for
all t, the terminal payoff S(T, x) is concave in x, g(t, x, u) is quasi-concave in (x, u) and
the function h(t, x) is quasi-concave in x, then (x∗, u∗) is an optimal solution.
Furthermore if the maximized Hamiltonian function H] is strictly concave in x for all
t, then the optimal state x∗ (but not necessarily u∗) is unique.
To summarize, the Mangasarian sufficiency theorem basically says that the maximum
principle is also sufficient if the Hamiltonian is concave with respect to both the state x
and the control u, whereas with the Arrow sufficiency theorem we need the maximized
Hamiltonian to be concave with respect to only the state x [20].
2.3 Numerical Solutions of Optimal Control Problems
This section is devoted to the presentation of the Forward-Backward sweep algorithm
for the solution of optimal control problems. The algorithm alternates the numerical
solution of the state equations forward in time, the adjoint equation backward in time
and the update of the optimal control using the maximisation principle.
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We present the algorithm for a basic optimal control problems without constraints. It
can be extended in a straightforward way to a problem with constraints.
Consider the controlled dynamics below
ẋ(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.64)
with payoff functionals given as
J = S(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
F (t, x(t), u(t))dt. (2.65)
An application of the maximum principle gives the following necessary conditions for
optimality
ẋ∗ = ∇pH(t, x∗, u∗, p), x∗(0) = x0, (2.66)
ṗ∗ = −∇xH(t, x∗, u∗, p), p(T ) = ∇S(x(T )), (2.67)
H (t, x∗, u∗, p) ≥ H(t, x∗, u, p), (2.68)
for the Hamiltonian function
H(t, x, u, p) = p · f(t, x, u) + F (t, x, u),
2.3.1 Forward-Backward Sweep Algorithm
Consider the following algorithm from [23].
Algorithm 2.3.1 (Forward-Backward Sweep). The iterative algorithm to solve (2.64)-
(2.65) when H is a concave function of u is given by
1. Discretise the time variable t ∈ [0, T ] as t0 = 0, t1 = ∆t, t2 = 2∆t, . . . , tk =
k∆t, . . . , tN = N∆t, where ∆t is the time step and consider a piece-wise constant
guess of the control variable
u(t) = uk, t ∈ [tk, . . . , tN ],
2. Using the initial guess for u from step 1 and the initial condition x(0) = x0, we
solve the state equation (2.66) forward in time.
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3. Using the transversality condition p(T ) = ∇xS(x(t)) the values for u and x, we
solve the adjoint equation (2.67) backwards in time for the adjoint p .
4. Update the control u using the maximality condition (2.68).




| v(i) | −
N+1∑
i=1
| v(i)− vold(i) | ≥ 0, (2.69)
where ε is the tolerance, v(i) is the solution at the current iteration and vold(i) is
the solution at the last iteration.
(a) If (2.69) is satisfied, then end the iterative procedure and output the optimal
solution
(b) If (2.69) is not satisfied, then go back to step 2.
In steps 2 and 3 any good ODE solver may be used. We will use the Runge-Kutta 4
(RK4) algorithm. Hence in order to solve the state given by the differential equation
ẋ = f(t, x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0,
forward in time using RK4, we have
For i = 1, 2, . . . N,
x(i+ 1) = x(i) +
h
6
(K1 + 2K2 + 2K3 +K4) ,
where K1 = f(t(i), x(i), u(i)),
K2 = f(t(i) +
h





K3 = f(t(i) +
h




2(u(i) + u(i+ 1))),





and solving the adjoint given by the differential equation
ṗ = −∇xH(t, x, u, p), p(T ) = ∇S(x(T )),
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backward in time using RK4 gives us
For i = N + 1, N,N − 1, . . . , 2
p(i− 1) = p(i)− h
6
(K1 + 2K2 + 2K3 +K4) ,
where K1 = −∇xH(t(i), x(i), u(i), p(i)),
K2 = −∇xH(t(i)− h2 ,
1
2(x(i) + x(i− 1)),
1
2(u(i) + u(i− 1)), p(i)−
h
2K1),
K3 = −∇xH(t(i)− h2 ,
1
2(x(i) + x(i− 1)),
1
2(u(i) + u(i− 1)), p(i)−
h
2K2),





We will demonstrate below that the RK4 is accurate for the solution of optimal control
problems. For this we will display for some problems, the norm of the difference between
the exact solution and the approximate solution.
There are different norms that can be used to measure the error in the solution of an
optimal control problem. If there are discontinuities or singularities in the solution then
the L1 norm is found to be the most suitable to use. The L2 norm is used when there
is a uniform mesh . The max (or infinity) norm is the most sensitive measure of error
and returns the value of the maximum absolute error over the entire domain of solutions
[24].
We recall below the definitions of the L1, L2 and L∞ error norms of any vector y =
(y1, ...yN ).
L1 =|| ŷ − y ||1=
N∑
i=1
| ŷi − yi |,




| ŷi − yi |2
)1/2
,
L∞ =|| ŷ − y ||∞= max | ŷi − yi |, i = 1, 2, . . . N.
where ŷ and y denotes the respective vectors of size N of the approximate and exact
solutions.
Consider the following example from [17].
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x(t)2 + c · u(t)2
)
dt,
subject to the system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = u(t), x(0) = x0,
where c > 0.
















r (erT + e−rT )
)
.
with r = 1√
c
Solution. The Hamiltonian for the problem is given by
H(t, x, u, p) = p · f(t, x, u) + F (t, x, u)
= p · u− x2 − c · u2.
Applying the maximum principle, we obtain the following necessary conditions which






ẋ = u, x(0) = x0,
ṗ = 2x, p(T ) = 0.
We will use the values of x(0) = 1 for the initial condition, c = 1 for the constant c,
T = 2 for the terminal time, N = 1000 for the number of subintervals and ε = 0.001 for
the tolerance to solve the problem numerically using Algorithm 2.3.1.
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Hence using Algorithm 2.3.1 we obtain the following graphical results given by Figures
2.2 - 2.3
Figure 2.2
In Figure 2.2 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the state, control and
adjoint plotted against their respective exact solutions for Example 2.3.1. The fact that
the approximated optimal solution of the control, state and adjoint lies on the curve of
its respective exact solution verifies that the results obtained from Algorithm 2.3.1 are
indeed correct.
Figure 2.3: Optimal Payoff J∗(t) for Example 2.1.2
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In Figure 2.3 we present the approximated optimal solution plotted against the exact
solution of the payoff J∗(t) for Example 2.3.1. The value of the final payoff is given for




In order to verify our solution we will need to check the efficiency and accuracy of the
results by finding the error norms.
N || xapprox. − xexact ||∞ || uapprox. − uexact ||∞ || papprox. − pexact ||∞
10 1.8381× 10−3 5.9773× 10−4 1.4647× 10−3
50 2.0976× 10−4 8.4515× 10−4 2.1960× 10−4
100 2.2935× 10−4 9.0854× 10−4 1.8572× 10−4
500 2.7569× 10−4 9.6262× 10−4 1.7581× 10−4
1000 2.8006× 10−4 9.6957× 10−4 1.7552× 10−4
Table 2.1: Error norms for Example 2.3.1 for various values of N .

Example 2.3.2. Recall that previously the solution of Example 2.1.2 was found to satisfy

u] = −px
ẋ = x(d− u]) x(0) = x0,
ṗ = −d− (p+ µ) · (d− u]), p(T ) = γ,
γ ≥ 0, γ x(T ) = 0.
(2.70)
which satisfy the constraints
x(d− u) ≥ 0, (2.71)
and the slackness conditions
µ ≥ 0, µ x = 0, µ̇ ≤ 0. (2.72)
Solution. We will use the values of x(0) = 1 for the initial condition, d = 0.8 for
the consumption rate d, T = 1 for the terminal time, N = 1000 for the number of
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subintervals and ε = 0.001 for the tolerance to solve the problem numerically using
Algorithm 2.3.1.
Hence using Algorithm 2.3.1 we obtain the following graphical results given by Figure
2.4 - 2.5
Figure 2.4: Optimal State x∗(t), Control u∗(t), Adjoint λ∗(t) and Multiplier µ∗(t)
for Example 2.1.2
In Figure 2.4 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the state, control, adjoint
and Lagrange multiplier for Example 2.1.2.
Figure 2.5: Payoff J for Example 2.1.2
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In Figure 2.5 we present the approximated optimal solution of the payoff J∗(t) for
Example 2.1.2. The value of the final payoff is given for the approximate solution as
J∗(t) = 0.84807.

Example 2.3.3. Recall that previously the solution of Example 2.1.1 was found to satisfy
u] =
 1 if p1 − p2 > 0,0 if p1 − p2 < 0.
ẋ1 = αu
]x1, x1(0) = x10,
ẋ2 = α(1− u])x1, x2(0) = x20,
ṗ1 = −p1αu− p2α(1− u), p1(T ) = 0,
ṗ2 = −1, p2(T ) = 0,
(2.73)
with the exact solutions given as
u∗ =
 1 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,0 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
x∗1 =
 x10eαt if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,x10eαT−2 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
x∗2 =
 x20 if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,x20 + αx10(t− T + 2α)eαT−2 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
p∗1 =
 2αe(−αt+αT−2) if 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2,α
2 (t− T )
2 if T − 2 < t ≤ T,
p∗2 = T − t.
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Solution. We will use the values of x1(0) = 0.6 and x2(0) = 0.4 for the initial conditions,
α = 1, for the constant, T = 3 for the terminal time, N = 1000 for the number of
subintervals and ε = 0.001 for the tolerance to solve the problem numerically using
Algorithm 2.3.1.
By using Algorithm 2.3.1 we obtain the following graphical results given by Figure 2.6
- 2.9
Figure 2.6: Optimal Control u∗(t) for Example 2.1.1
In Figure 2.6 we present the approximated optimal solutions plotted against the exact
solutions of the control for Example 2.1.1.
Figure 2.7: Optimal States x∗1(t), x
∗
2(t) for Example 2.1.1
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In Figure 2.7 we present the approximated optimal solutions plotted against the exact
solutions of the state for Example 2.1.1.
Figure 2.8: Optimal Ajoints p∗1(t), p
∗
2(t) for Example 2.1.1
In Figure 2.8 we present the approximated optimal solutions plotted against the exact
solutions of the adjoint for Example 2.1.1.
Figure 2.9: Payoff P for Example 2.1.1
In Figure 2.9 we present the approximated optimal solution of the payoff J∗(t) for
Example 2.1.1. The value of the final payoff is given for the approximate solution as
J∗(t) = 4.4615 and for the exact solution as J∗exact(t) = 4.4621.
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The fact that the approximated optimal solution of the control, state, adjoint and payoff
lies on the curve of its respective exact solution verifies that the results obtained from
Algorithm 2.3.1 are indeed correct.
The following table verifies the efficiency and accuracy of the results by displaying the
error norms.
N Iterations || x1 − x̃1 ||∞ || x2 − x̃2 ||∞ || u− ũ ||∞ || p1 − p̃1 ||∞ || p2 − p̃2 ||∞
100 14 7.0831× 10−3 6.8497× 10−3 7.7515× 10−3 6.5239× 10−4 6.5239× 10−4
250 14 2.1739× 10−3 1.9344× 10−3 1.5564× 10−2 5.3563× 10−4 5.3563× 10−4
500 14 2.8851× 10−3 3.0193× 10−3 1.5564× 10−3 5.1461× 10−3 5.1461× 10−3
1000 14 1.4409× 10−3 1.2975× 10−3 6.2439× 10−2 5.1200× 10−4 5.1200× 10−4
Table 2.2: Error norms for Example 2.1.1 for various values of N .

Example 2.3.4. Recall that previously the solution of Example 2.1.4 was found to satisfy
u] =
λ · (1− x)
k
,
ẋ = u](1− x)− x, x(0) = x0,




, λ(T ) = δ1 − δ2,
δ1 x(T ) = 0, δ1 ≥ 0,
δ2 (1− x(T )) = 0, δ2 ≥ 0.
where ν = ν1 − ν2, satisfying the constraints
u(1− x)− x ≥ 0,
x− u(1− x) ≥ 0,
(2.74)
and the slackness conditions ν1(t) ≥ 0, ν1(t) x(t) = 0, ν̇1(t) ≤ 0,ν2(t) ≥ 0, ν2(t) (1− x(t)) = 0, ν̇2(t) ≤ 0. (2.75)
to determine the state x and the adjoint variable λ.
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Solution. We will use the values of
x(0) = 0.45 for the initial condition,
k = 1 for the constants,
r = 0.09 for the interest rates,
φ = 0.5 for the fractional revenues,
T = 1 for the terminal time,
N = 1000 for the number of subintervals and
ε = 0.001 for the tolerance
to solve the problem numerically using Algorithm 2.3.1.
Hence using Algorithm 2.3.1 we obtain the following graphical results given by Figure
2.10 - 2.11
Figure 2.10: Optimal State x∗(t), Control u∗(t), Adjoint λ∗(t) and Multiplier µ∗(t)
for Example 2.1.4
In Figure 2.10 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the state, control,
adjoint and Lagrange multiplier for Example 2.1.4.
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Figure 2.11: Payoff P for Example 2.1.4
In Figure 2.11 we present the approximated optimal solution of the payoff J∗(t) for








subject to gi(x) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
hj(x) ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , p
(2.76)
where f and all the gi’s and hj ’s are differentiable.
By use of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions the idea of Lagrange multipliers
can be extended to handle inequality constraints as well as equality constraints. These
conditions provide a first order optimality condition for the problem (2.76) known as
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gi(x) = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
µjhj(x)j(x) = 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , p
hj(x) ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , p
µj ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , p
(2.77)
where η1, η2, . . . ηm are the Lagrange multipliers and µ1, µ2, . . . µp are the KKT multi-
pliers.
Let us consider the utility maximization problem. This problem is studied in various ar-
eas of economics and finance [25–27]. For the basic problem a utility function determines
the satisfaction or utility experienced by a consumer after receiving a certain amount
of a specific good (or service) and a different amount of another good (or service). The
problem the consumer faces is to calculate the amount of each good (or service) they
need to buy in order to maximize their utility while abiding by a fixed budget.
Consider the simple modified utility maximization problem from [28].
Example 2.4.1. Consider a firm selling two products in a competitive market where,
x1 = a unit of the first product,
x2 = a unit of the second product,
A unit of the first product x1 costs p1 and a unit of the second product x2 costs p2. The
consumer wishes to spend a complete total of B. The consumer can buy no more than
d1 units of the first product and d2 units of the second product. The consumer aims to
maximize their utility which is given by
U(x1, x2) = a lnx1 + (1− a) lnx2
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Solution. Mathematically this problem is to be formulated as the following COP,
maximize
x1,x2
a lnx1 + (1− a) lnx2
subject to p1x1 + p2x2 = B,
x1 ≤ d1,
x2 ≤ d2.
Let a = 0.4, p1 = 20, p2 = 30, B = 600, d1 = 20, d2 = 15. The Lagrangian for the
problem is given as,
L(x1, x2, η, µ1, µ2) = 0.4 lnx1+0.6 lnx2+η [600− 20x1 − 30x2]+µ1 [20− x1]+µ2 [15− x2] .




− 20η − µ1 = 0, 35x2 − 30η − µ2 = 0,
600− 20x1 − 30x2 = 0,
20− x1 ≥ 0, 15− x2 ≥ 0,
µ1 [20− x1] = 0, µ2 [15− x2] = 0,
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0.
(2.78)
We will now consider the following four cases,
Case 1: µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0, 20− x1 6= 0, 15− x2 6= 0, for this case solving the above
system of equations given by (2.78) simultaneously we get the values of,
x1 = 12, x2 = 12, η =
1
600 , µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0.
Case 2: µ1 = 0, µ2 6= 0, 20− x1 6= 0, 15− x2 = 0, for this case solving the above
system of equations given by (2.78) simultaneously we get the values of,
x1 =
15
2 , x2 = 15, η =
1
375 , µ1 = 0, µ2 = −
1
25 .
Case 3: µ1 6= 0, µ2 = 0, 20− x1 = 0, 15− x2 6= 0, for this case solving the above
system of equations given by (2.78) simultaneously we get the values of,
x1 = 20, x2 =
20
3 , η =
3
1000 , µ1 = −
1
25 , µ2 = 0.
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Case 4: µ1 6= 0, µ2 6= 0, 20− x1 = 0, 15− x2 = 0, for this case solving the above
system of equations given by (2.78) simultaneously we get the values of x1, and
x2 as 20 and 15 respectively. Notice that for these values of x1 and x2 the budget
constraint 20x1 + 30x2 = 600 is not satisfied, hence we can disregard this case.
From the dual feasibility condition of the KKT we know that µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 ≥ 0 hence
we only consider those solutions which satisfy this condition. The optimal solution is
identified as,
x1 = 12, x2 = 12, η =
1
600
, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0.




Previously in Chapter 2 we dealt with the case where a single individual made a decision
and optimized a payoff. In this chapter, we consider the case of an N -player differential
game where there are many decision makers, which we will call players, aim to optimize
their respective objective functions under the dynamics of the game.
Differential games are an extension of static game where players choose their strategy
from a finite number of possibilities. These games are also called matrix game [29–33].
Unlike in optimal control or optimisation problems where it is very clear what optimality
is, in game theory the concept of solution is not trivial. This is because what one player
considers as optimality can be very disastrous for any of the other players.
Different concepts of solutions have been proposed [30]. One solution concept is that of
Pareto optimality, where it is not possible to strictly increase the payoff of one player
without strictly decreasing the payoff of the other. Another concept of solution in game
theory, which we will focus on in this dissertation is the concept of Nash equilibrium.
A set of strategies is called a Nash equilibrium if any player who deviates from the
equilibrium strategy fails to improve his payoff. Other solution concepts can e found in
[34–37].
A noteworthy classification in game theory is between cooperative and non-cooperative
games. In a cooperative game, the players can communicate and negotiate with each
other and arrive at a mutual decision for their actions [38]. In a non-cooperative game
there is no form of communication between the players, therefore each player will aim
to optimize their objective function whilst deducing the behaviour of the other players.
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3.1 Formulation of the Problem
Definition 3.1.1 (N -player differential game). In general a N -player differential game
played on a time interval [0, T ] has following elements:
(i) A set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n},
(ii) For each Player i ∈ N , a vector of controls ui(t) ∈ Ui ⊂ Rni , where Ui is the set
of admissible control values for Player i,
(iii) A vector of state variables x ∈ X ⊂ Rn,where X is the set of admissible states. The
evolution of the state variables is governed by a system of differential equations,
called the state equations:
ẋ(t) = f(t, x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0 (3.1)
where u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t), . . . , un(t)). Equation (3.1) is often called the state
equation. It describes the state of the game at every time t.
(iv) A payoff for Player i ∈ N ,
Ji(u)
.




where function Fi is Player i’s running payoff and function Si is his terminal payoff,
(v) An information structure, that is information available to Player i when he chooses
strategy ui(t) at time t,
(vi) A strategy set Ψi, where a strategy ψi ∈ Ψi is a decision rule that defines the
control ui(t) ∈ Ui as a function of the information available at time t .
We may have additional constraints on either the control set of the players Ui or on the
state of the game X. This may lead to having a strategy set depending on the control set
Ui. In this dissertation, we will consider the case for where the set of admissible states
is defined via an inequality of the form,
h(t, x) ≥ 0, (3.3)
which is called a pure state constraint.
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In order to have a well posed problem we need to specify what information is available
to the players.
Definition 3.1.2. In the N -player differential game given by Definition 3.1.1 of a du-
ration [0, T ], we say that Player i’s information structures is
(i) Open-loop if at time t the only information available to Player i is the initial state
of the game x0, hence his strategy set can be written as Ψi(t) = {x0} , t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) Feedback if Player i uses the state of the game (t, x(t)) as information basis,
hence his strategy set can be written as Ψi(t) = {x(t)} , t ∈ [0, T ].
(iii) Closed-loop perfect state if Player i recalls the whole history of the state up to
time t, hence his strategy set can be written as Ψi(t) = {x(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} , t ∈ [0, T ].
(iv) ε-delayed closed-loop perfect state if the information available to Player i is
the state with a delay of ε units, hence his strategy set can be written as
Ψi(t) = {x(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t− ε}, where ε > 0 is fixed.
Note that we will be focusing on open-loop games only. Feedback equilibrium solutions
are found using a dynamic programming approach. The theorem presented below, spec-
ifies conditions on the functions f, F, ψ for which the differential equation given by
(3.1) has a unique solution.
Theorem 3.1.3. For the N -player differential game given by Definition 3.1.1 of a du-
ration [0, T ] which has any one of the information structures given above. If
(i) f(t, x, u1, u2, . . . , un) is continuous in t ∈ [0, T ] for each x ∈ Rn, i ∈ N ,
(ii) f(t, x, u1, u2, . . . , un) is uniformly Lipschitz in x, u1, u2, . . . , un. That is for some
k > 0,
| f(t, x, u1, u2, . . . , un)− f(t, x̄, ū1, ū2, . . . , ūn) |≤ k max
0≤t≤T
{
| x(t)− x̄(t) | +
∑
i∈N
| ui − ūi |
}
,
x(·), x̄(·) ∈ Cn[0, T ],
ui(·), ūi(·) ∈ Ui (i ∈ N)
(iii) for ψi ∈ Ψi, (i ∈ N), ψi(t, x) is continuous in t for each x(·) ∈ Cn[0, T ] and
uniformly Lipschitz in x(·) ∈ Cn[0, T ],
differential equation given by (3.1) has a unique solution that is continuous.
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3.1.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
The idea of a Nash equilibrium was proposed by John Forbes Nash, Jr [20, 39]. Game
situations where cooperation between the players are not allowed normally concern Nash
equilibrium solutions. The Nash equilibrium solution concept safe guards against any
attempts by a single player of unilaterally altering his strategy, since a deviation from
the Nash equilibrium may not be beneficial to him [34].
For brevity, we denote [ui, u
∗















The Nash equilibrium can be defined as,
Definition 3.1.4 (Nash Equilibrium). A Nash solution u∗i , i ∈ N is defined by
Ji(u
∗) ≥ Ji([ui, u∗−i]), (3.4)
for all admissible ui, i ∈ N , where Ji is the criterion which Player i wants to maximize.
and hence in terms of optimization and optimal control we have,
Theorem 3.1.5 (Nash Equilibrium). The n-tuple of control functions u∗ is an open-
loop Nash Equilibrium for the N -player differential game given by Definition 3.1.1 and
constrained by (3.3) if for all i ∈ N the following holds
• For Player i, the control u∗i gives the solution to the OCP:
max Ji([ui, u
∗
−i]) = Si(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
Fi(t, x, [ui, u
∗
−i])dt, (3.5)
over all the controls ui, for the system with dynamics
ẋ = f(t, x, [ui, u
∗
−i]), x(0) = x0 ∈ R
n, (3.6)
subject to the pure state constraints
h(t, x(t)) ≥ 0. (3.7)
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From Definition 3.1.5, we can see that finding a Nash equilibrium amounts to simulta-
neously solving optimal control problems, one for each player. Thanks to the maximum
principle, we can derive a set of necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium of any
differential game. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n we introduce the Hamiltonian of Player i as
Hi(t, x,u, pi) = pi · f(t, x,u) + Fi(t, x,u), (3.8)
which allows us to handle the constraints (3.6) through a multiplier p. Using the indirect
adjoining method [see, Section 2.1], we define the Lagrangian of Player i as,
Li[t, x,u, pi, µi] = Hi(t, x,u, pi) + µi · ḣ(t, x,u), (3.9)
which allows us to handle the constraints (3.7) through a multiplier µ.
We require that the maximisation condition of the maximum principle [see, Theorem
2.1.4], always has a solution as presented in the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × RN and any vectors pi,∈ RN , there exists a









for each t ∈ [0, T ] for all ui which satisfies
ḣ[t, x(t), ui(t)] ≥ 0 whenever h[t, x(t)] = 0.
where Hi is the Hamiltonian function as defined by (3.8). The corresponding map will
be denoted by
(t, x, pi) 7→ u]i(t, x, pi).
We can now propose a method for finding open loop Nash equilibrium for an N -player
differential game.
Proposition 3.1.6. Let Assumption 1 hold. For i ∈ N , let the control u∗i be an optimal
solution for the N -player differential game given by Definition 3.1.1 and constrained by
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(3.3). Then u∗i solves the following two point boundary value problem (BVP)




(t, x, u]i, µi), pi(T ) = ∇xSi(x(T )) + γ∇h(T, x(T )),
γ ≥ 0, γ h(T, x∗(T )) = 0.
(3.11)
which satisfies the complementary slackness conditions,
µi(t) ≥ 0, µi(t) h(t, x∗(t)) = 0, µ̇i(t) ≤ 0.
Consider the following example for the case where N = 2 from Bressan [40].
Example 3.1.1 (Producer-Consumer Game). We consider a firm manufacturing a good
where,
x(t) = the sale price of a good at time t,
and for the controls, at each time t, a good is produced by the firm at rate u1 and
consumed by the consumer at rate u2. So the controls for our problem are defined as:
u1(t) = rate of production of a good at time t,
u2(t) = rate of consumption of a good at time t,
and
ci(s) = cost function of Firm i








The price increases when the consumption of goods is larger than the production of goods,
and decreases otherwise, that is we have the following system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = x(t)(u2(t)− u1(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ],
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with constraints given by
x(t) ≥ 0. (3.12)
The payoff functional for Firm 1 is measured by the profit generated by sales, minus
the cost c1(u1(t)) of producing the good at rate u1(t) and for Firm 2 is measured by the
initial capital the consumer has, minus the price payed to buy the x(t)u2(t) of producing








[c2(u2(t))− x(t) · u2(t)] dt, (3.13)
We aim to find the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash Equilibrium for the
problem.
Solution. The Hamiltonian functions for the players in this problem is given by
H1(t, x, u1, u2, p1) = p1 · f(t, x, u1, u2) + F1(t, x, u1, u2)





H2(t, x, u1, u2, p2) = p2 · f(t, x, u1, u2) + F2(t, x, u1, u2)
= p2 · x(u2 − u1) + 2
√
u2 − xu2.
The Lagrangian functions for the players in this problem is given by
L1[t, x, u1, u2, p1, µ1] = H1[t, x, u1, u2, p1] + µ1 · ḣ(t, x, u1, u2)




+ x · (p1 + µ1) (u2 − u1),
and
L2[t, x, u1, u2, p2, µ2] = H2[t, x, u1, u2, p2] + µ2 · ḣ(t, x, u1, u2)
= H2[t, x, u1, u2, p2] + µ2 · (ht + hx · f)
= 2
√
u2 − xu2 + x · (p2 + µ2) (u2 − u1).
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From Assumption 1 and the Hamiltonian maximization condition (iii) of Theorem
(2.1.4) we can write our pair of optimal controls (u\1(t, x, λ1), u
\
2(t, x, λ2)) as
u]1 = argmax
u1∈U1












{H2(t, x, u1, u2, λ2)}
= argmax
u2∈U2





(x · (1− p2))2
for each t ∈ [0, T ] and for all u1, u2 which satisfies
x(u2 − u1) ≥ 0.










+ x · (p1 + µ1) (u2 − u1)
}









u2 − xu2 + x · (p2 + µ2) (u2 − u1)}
= (p2 + µ2) (u1 − u2) + u2,
along with the transversality conditions
p1(T ) = ∇S1(T, x(T )) + δ1∇h(T, x(T ))
= δ1,
δ1x(T ) = 0, δ1 ≥ 0,
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and
p2(T ) = ∇S2(T, x(T )) + δ2∇h(T, x(T ))
= δ2,
δ2x(T ) = 0, δ2 ≥ 0.
Putting all together gives







(x · (1− p2))2
+ p1x
)
, x(0) = x0,






2, p1(T ) = δ1
= − (p1 + µ1)
(
1




(x · (1− p2))2
, δ1 x(T ) = 0,
δ1 ≥ 0,






2, p2(T ) = δ2,
= − (p2 + µ2)
(
1





(x · (1− p2))2
, δ2 x(T ) = 0,
δ2 ≥ 0.
(3.14)
which satisfy the constraints
x(u2 − u1) ≥ 0, (3.15)
and the slackness conditions µ1 ≥ 0, µ1 x = 0, µ̇1 ≤ 0,µ2 ≥ 0, µ2 x = 0, µ̇2 ≤ 0. (3.16)
to determine the state x and the adjoint variables p1 and p2.

Remark 3.1.7. In Section 4.1 we will solve this problem further using a numerical method.
Consider the following example for the case where N = 2 from Torres and Esparza [1].
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Example 3.1.2 (Duopolistic Market). Consider two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, selling
the same product in a competitive market where,
x(t) = Firm 1 ’s market share at time t,
1− x(t) = Firm 2’s market share at time t,
and for the controls, at each time t, an advertising strategy is implemented by the firms.
So the controls for our problem are defined as:
ui(t) = advertising effort of Firm i at time t,
and
ri = Firm i’s interest rate,
φi = Firm i’s fractional revenue potential,
ci(s) = advertising cost function.






where ki is a positive constant.
The number of customers at Firm 1 increases by the advertising efforts of Firm 1 and
the advertising efforts of Firm 2 draws customers away from Firm 1, hence we have the
following system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = u1(t)(1− x(t))− u2(t)x(t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.17)
with constraints given by
0 ≤ x(t) ≤ 1, (3.18)








e−r2t [φ2(1− x(t))− c2(u2(t))] dt.
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Here, the action of one firm does not directly effect the other firms payoff, but it effects
the payoff indirectly through the state dynamics. We aim to find the necessary conditions
for an open-loop Nash Equilibrium for the problem.
Solution. The Hamiltonian functions for the players in this problem is given by
Hc1(t, x, u1, u2, λ1) = λ1 · f(t, x, u1, u2) + F1(t, x, u1, u2)







Hc2(t, x, u1, u2, λ2) = λ2 · f(t, x, u1, u2) + F2(t, x, u1, u2)






where λ1 = e
r1t · p1 and λ2 = er2t · p2.
The Lagrangian functions for the players in this problem is given by
Lc1[t, x, u1, u2, λ1, ν11, ν12] = H
c
1[t, x, u1, u2, λ1] + ν11 · f − ν12 · f
= Hc1[t, x, u1, u2, λ1] + (ν11 − ν12) (u1(1− x)− u2x)







Lc2[t, x, u1, u2, λ2, ν21, ν22] = H
c
2[t, x, u1, u2, λ2] + ν21 · f − ν22 · f
= Hc2[t, x, u1, u2, λ2] + (ν21 − ν22) (u1(1− x)− u2x)






where ν1 = ν11 − ν12 and ν2 = ν21 − ν22.
From Assumption 1 and the Hamiltonian maximization condition (iii) of Theorem
(2.1.5) we can write our pair of optimal controls (u]1(t, x, λ1), u
]
2(t, x, λ2)) as
u]1 = argmax
u1∈U1
































for each t ∈ [0, T ] and for all u1, u2 which satisfy
u1(1− x)− u2x ≥ 0,
u2x− u1(1− x) ≥ 0.
From condition (ii) of Theorem (2.1.5) we find that the adjoint equations are given by,












= (λ1 + ν1)(u1 + u2)− φ1,
and












= (λ2 + ν2)(u1 + u2) + φ2,
along with the transversality conditions
λ1(T ) = ∇S1(T, x(T )) + δ11∇h1(T, x(T )) + δ12∇h2(T, x(T )),
= δ11 − δ12,
λ2(T ) = ∇S2(T, x(T )) + δ21∇h1(T, x(T )) + δ22∇h2(T, x(T )),
= δ21 − δ22,
δ11x(T ) = 0, δ12 (1− x(T )) = 0, δ21 x(T ) = 0, δ22 (1− x(T )) = 0,
δ11 ≥ 0, δ12 ≥ 0, δ21 ≥ 0, δ22 ≥ 0.
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Putting all together gives











, x(0) = x0,




2)− φ1 λ1(T ) = δ11 − δ12







− φ1, δ11 x(T ) = 0, δ12 (1− x(T )) = 0,
δ11 ≥ 0, δ12 ≥ 0,




2) + φ2, λ2(T ) = δ21 − δ22,







+ φ2, δ21 x(T ) = 0, δ22 (1− x(T )) = 0,
δ21 ≥ 0, δ22 ≥ 0.
(3.19)
which satisfy the constraints
u1(1− x)− u2x ≥ 0,
u2x− u1(1− x) ≥ 0,
(3.20)
and the slackness conditions
ν11 ≥ 0, ν11 x = 0, ˙ν11 ≤ 0,
ν12 ≥ 0, ν12 (1− x) = 0, ˙ν12 ≤ 0,
ν21 ≥ 0, ν21 x = 0, ˙ν21 ≤ 0,
ν22 ≥ 0, ν22 (1− x) = 0, ˙ν22 ≤ 0.
(3.21)
to determine the state x and the adjoint variables λ1 and λ2.

Remark 3.1.8. In order to ensure that the open-loop Nash equilibrium for the N -player
differential is indeed optimal, we will need to check for sufficiency.
Sufficiency Conditions of open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions
Using the maximum principle to solve the N -player differential game problem only
provides us with necessary conditions for optimality, but it does not assure us that the
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n-tuple of controls (u∗1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
n) is indeed an open-loop Nash equilibrium since this
n-tuple may not be optimal. We will use Theorem (2.2.1) to derive a set of sufficiency
conditions for the problem.
Theorem 3.1.9 (Sufficient Conditions for open-loop Nash equilibrium). For the N -
player differential game given by Definition 3.1.1 and constrained by (3.3), consider the
measurable function t 7→ u∗i ∈ Ui and the continuous functions x∗, pi, µi satisfying




(t, x, u∗i , pi, µi), pi(T ) = ∇xSi(x(T )) + γ∇xh(T, x(T )),
γ ≥ 0, γ h(T, x(T )) = 0.
together with
Hi(t, x
∗, u∗i , p
∗
i ) = max
ui∈Ui
{Hi(t, x∗, ui, p∗i )} ,
for all ui which satisfy
ḣ[t, x(t), ui(t)] ≥ 0, whenever h[t, x(t)] = 0.
and also the complementary slackness conditions,
µi(t) ≥ 0, µi(t) h(t, x∗(t)) = 0, µ̇i(t) ≤ 0.
Suppose that the set Ui is convex for every x ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ], the partial derivatives of
the functions Fi(t, x, ui) and f(t, x, ui) are continuous with respect to their arguments.
If the Hamiltonian function Hi exists and is concave in x, ui for all t, the terminal
payoff Si(T, x) is concave in x, and h(t, x) is quasiconcave in (x, ui), then u
∗
i is a Nash
equilibrium solution and x∗ is the corresponding trajectory.
If the Hamiltonian function Hi is strictly concave in (x, ui) for all t, then u
∗
i is the
unique Nash equilibrium solution and x∗ is the corresponding trajectory.
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3.1.2 Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibrium
Here we have an asymmetric game situation where the players can communicate, and
therefore they can swap ideas on their strategies. For this equilibrium solution there is a
hierarchy in the decision making process. The concept of solutions for hierarchical game
situations where one player has domination over the other player was introduced by von
Stackelberg in 1934. Hierarchical game situation results in players taking on either the
role of a leader or of a follower [41]. A Stackelberg solution is obtained when the leaders
have achieved their maximum payoff, based on and considering the optimal strategies
of the followers [42].
We will consider a 2-player differential game where Player 1 takes on the role of the
leader and Player 2 takes on the role of the follower.
Let us consider the following definition.
Definition 3.1.10 (Best Response). The strategy u2 ∈ U2 is Player 2’s best response
to Player 1’s strategy u1 ∈ U1 if
J2(u1, u2) ≥ J2(u1, u∗2) ∀u∗2 ∈ U2 u∗2 6= u2
i.e Player 2’s strategy u2 will give the highest possible payoff given that Player 1 plays
strategy u1.
We are now ready to define the Stackelberg equilibrium.
The set of best responses for Player 2, given Player 1 chooses the strategy u1 ∈ U1 is
denoted as
R2(u1) = {u2 ∈ U2; J2(u1, u2) ≥ J2(u1, u∗2) ∀u∗2 ∈ U2 u2 6= u∗2},
and similarly the set of best responses for Player 1, given Player 2 chooses the strategy
u2 ∈ U2 is denoted as
R1(u2) = {u1 ∈ U1; J1(u1, u2) ≥ J1(u∗1, u2) ∀u∗1 ∈ U1 u1 6= u∗1}.
Hence assuming Player 1 chooses any admissible control u∗1 : [0, T ] 7→ U1 then the set
of best responses for Player 2 is R2(u∗1). This simply means that R2(u∗1) is the set of
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all admissible control functions u2 : [0, T ] 7→ U2 in relation with u∗1 that maximizes the
payoff for Player 2. That is, the set of best responses for Player 2 solves the OCP
maximize J2(u
∗






over all the controls u1, u2, for the system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = f(t, x, u∗1, u2), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn,
h(t, x) ≥ 0 u2(t) ∈ U2.
Definition 3.1.11 (Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibrium). A pair of control functions
t 7→ (u∗1(t), u∗2(t)) is an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for the 2-player differential
game within the framework of Definition 3.1.1 and constrained by (3.3) if the following
conditions hold:
(i) u∗2 ∈ R2(u∗1)
(ii) Given any admissible control u1 for Player 1 and every best response u2 ∈ R2(u1)








subject to the dynamics
ẋ(t) = f(t, x, u∗1, u
∗
2), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn,
h(t, x) ≥ 0.
From Definition 3.1.11, we can see that for us to get an open-loop Stackelberg equilib-
rium, Player 1 will have to find the best response of Player 2 for each and every one
of his controls u1, and he will have to choose the control function u
∗
1 such that his own
payoff will be maximized.
Due to the hierarchy between the leader and follower a set of necessary conditions for
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium will first be found for the follower and then for
the leader [43]. To find these necessary conditions, we use a combination of variational
analysis [see, 44–46] along with the maximum principle.
Let (u∗1, u
∗
2) be the controls for Players 1 and 2 respectively and x
∗ be the corresponding
optimal trajectory of the dynamic system.
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For Player 2: We know that u∗2 is the optimal response for Player 2, thus by the
maximum principle there exists an adjoint vector p∗2 such that














p∗2(T ) = ∇S2(x∗(T )) + γ∇h(T, x∗(T ))
γ ≥ 0, γ h(T, x∗(T )) = 0.
(3.22)
Furthermore, the subsequent conditions for optimality
u∗2 ∈ argmax
u2∈U2
{H2(t, x∗, u∗1, u2, p∗2)} (3.23)
for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] for all u1, u2 which satisfy
ḣ[t, x∗(t), u1(t), u2(t)] ≥ 0. whenever h(t, x∗(t)) = 0. (3.24)
hold.
For Player 1: In order to obtain a set of necessary conditions for optimality, we will
need to assume
Assumption 2. For every (t, x, u1, p2) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × U1 × Rn there exists a unique





{H2(t, x, u1, u2, p2)}
for all u1, u2 which satisfy
ḣ[t, x(t), u1(t), u2(t)] ≥ 0, whenever h[t, x(t)] = 0.
We are now able to construct Player 1’s optimization problem as an OCP. This OCP
will have an extended state space with the state variables (x, p2) ∈ Rn × Rn. That is,
the OCP for Player 1 is
maximize S1(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
F1(t, x(t), u1(t), u
]
2(t, x(t), u1(t), p2(t)))dt (3.25)
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for the system on R2n with dynamics
ẋ(t) = f(t, x, u1, u
]




(t, x, u1, u
]
2(t, x, u1, p2), µ2),
p2(T ) = ∇S2(x(T )) + γ∇h(T, x(T )),
γ ≥ 0, γ h(T, x(T )) = 0.
(3.26)
Although this is clearly a standard problem in optimal control theory, notice that the
of state variables (x, p2) are not both given at time t = 0. Rather, at t = 0 the initial
constraint x = x0 is given while at t = T the end condition p2 = ∇xS2(x) + γ∇xh(T, x)
is provided.
To ensure the existence of solution to (3.26), we need the following assumption.
Assumption 3. For all fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and u1 ∈ U1, the maps
(x, p2) 7→ F̃ (t, x, u1, p2)
.
= F1(t, x, u1, u
]
2(t, x, u1, p2))
(x, p2) 7→ f̃(t, x, u1, p2)
.
= f(t, x, u1, u
]
2(t, x, u1, p2))
(x, p2) 7→ L̃(t, x, u1, p2, µ2)
.
= −∇xL2(t, x, u1, u]2(t, x, u1, p2), µ2)
x 7→ S̃1(T, x(T ))
.
= ∇S1(T, x) + γ∇h(T, x),
x 7→ S̃2(T, x(T ))
.
= ∇S2(T, x) + γ∇h(T, x),
are continuously differentiable.
If we apply the maximum principle for constrained initial and end points to the OCP
(3.25)-(3.26), then we will obtain a set of necessary condition for open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium solutions.
Theorem 3.1.12 (Open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium necessary conditions). Let As-
sumption 2 and 3 hold. Let t 7→ (u∗1, u∗2) be the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for
the 2-player differential game within the framework of Definition 3.1.1 with constraint
(3.3), and x∗, p∗2 be the corresponding trajectory and adjoint vector for Player 2 that
satisfy (3.22)-(3.24).
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Then there exists a constant κ0 ≥ 0 and two absolutely continuous adjoint vectors κ1, κ2





κ̇2 = −κ0 ∂F̃∂p2 − κ1
∂f̃
∂p2
− κ2 ∂L̃∂p2 ,
(3.27)
for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] together with the boundary conditions
κ2(0) = 0,
κ1(T ) = κ0S̃1 − κ2(T )D2S̃2.
(3.28)
Furthermore, for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] we have
u∗1(t) = argmax
u1∈U1
 κ0F̃ (t, x∗(t), u1, p∗2(t)) + κ1(t)f̃(t, x∗(t), u1, p∗2(t))+κ2(t)L̃(t, x∗(t), u1, p∗2(t), µ∗2(t))
 . (3.29)
for all u1, u2 which satisfy
ḣ[t, x(t), u1(t), u2(t)] ≥ 0, whenever h[t, x(t)] = 0. (3.30)




1), also the function
D2S̃2 denotes the Hessian matrix of second derivatives of the function S2(x) + γh(T, x)
at point x.
Consider the following example from Bressan [40].
Example 3.1.3 (Growth of an Economy). We consider the growth of an economy with
respect to Player 1 (government) and Player 2 (capitalist) where,
x(t) = the total wealth of the Capitalists at time t,
a = constant growth rate of the wealth,
and for the controls, at each time t, the government will impose a capital tax rate which
will effect the amount of consumption of the capitalists. So the controls for our problem
are defined as:
u1(t) = capital tax rate imposed by the government,
u2(t) = instantaneous amount of consumption,
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also, we have
φi = a utility function,






We have the following system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = ax(t)− u1(t)x(t)− u2(t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.31)
We have constraints given by
x(t) ≥ 0.
The payoff functionals for the 2 players are given as








We aim to find an open-loop Stackelberg Equilibrium for the problem, where the govern-
ment is the leader who announces in advance the tax rate u1 and the capitalists are the
followers.
Solution. The Hamiltonian function for the capitalists in this problem is given by
H2(t, x, u1, u2, p2) = p2 · f(t, x, u1, u2) + F2(t, x, u1, u2)




and the Lagrangian function for the capitalists in this problem is given by
L2[t, x, u1, u2, p2, µ2] = H2[t, x, u1, u2, p2] + µ2 · ḣ(t, x, u1, u2)
= H2[t, x, u1, u2, p2] + µ2 · (ht + hx · f)
= H2[t, x, u1, u2, p2] + µ2 · f
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for all u1, u2 which satisfy
ax− u1x− u2 ≥ 0.
From Assumption 3 we have the following functions
F̃ (t, x, u1, p2) = F1(t, x, u1, u
]






f̃(t, x, u1, p2) = f(t, x, u1, u
]
2(t, x, u1, p2))





L̃(t, x, u1, p2, µ2) = −
∂
∂x
L2(t, x, u1, u
]









= −(p2 + µ2) (a− u1) ,
S̃2(T, x(T )) = ∇S2(x) +∇γh(T, x)
= 1 + γ.
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for the system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = ax− u1x−
p2
c2
, x(0) = x0,
ṗ2(t) = −(p2 + µ2) (a− u1) , p2(T ) = 1 + γ
γ ≥ 0, γ x(T ) = 0.

















) + κ2(−(p2 + µ2) (a− u1))
}
=
κ1x− κ2(p2 + µ2)
κ0c1x2
for all u1, u2 which satisfy
ax− u1x− u2 ≥ 0.
Putting all together gives











ṗ2 = −(p2 + µ2)(a− u]1)
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with the initial and end conditions
x(0) = x0, p2(T ) = 1 + γ,
κ1(T ) = κ0b, κ2(0) = 0,
γ x(T ) = 0, γ ≥ 0.
(3.33)





In the previous section we have seen that analytically solving an N -player differential
game problem completely is a challenging task. In this chapter, we propose numerical
algorithms that allows us to approximately solve an N -player differential game.
This is done by adapting the Forward-Backward sweep algorithm presented in Section
2.3 for the solution of differential games. The algorithm is derived from the maximum
principle of optimal control. As we have pointed out in Section 3.1.1, finding open
loop Nash equilibrium for a differential game amounts to solving many optimal control
problems, one for each player.
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, consider the N -player differential game which has the following
system with dynamics
ẋ(t) = f(t, x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.1)
and payoff functionals given as




where u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t), . . . , un(t)).
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We denote [ui, u
∗
















Applying the maximum principle, we obtain the following necessary conditions for op-
timization.
















for the Hamiltonian functions
Hi(t, x,u, pi) = pi · f(t, x,u) + Fi(t, x,u),




In order to solve (4.1)-(4.2) we will use an extension of the Forward-Backward Sweep
algorithm.
4.1 Forward-Backward Sweep Algorithm
Consider the following algorithm which is an extension of Algorithm 2.3.1.
Algorithm 4.1.1 (Forward-Backward Sweep). The iterative algorithm to solve (4.1)-
(4.2) when Hi is a concave function of ui is given by
1. Discretise the time variable t ∈ [0, T ] as t0 = 0, t1 = ∆t, t2 = 2∆t, . . . , tk =
k∆t, . . . , tN = N∆t, where ∆t is the time step and consider a piece-wise constant
guess for the strategy of the players
u(t) = u(tk), t ∈ [tk, . . . , tN ],
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2. Using the initial guess for ui from step 1 and the initial condition x(0) = x0, we
solve the state equation (4.3) forward in time.
3. Using the transversality condition pi(T ) = ∇xSi(x) and the stored values for ui
and x, we solve the adjoint equation (4.4) backwards in time for the adjoint pi .
4. Update the control u using the maximality condition (4.5).




| v(i) | −
N+1∑
i=1
| v(i)− vold(i) | ≥ 0, (4.6)
where ε is the tolerance, v(i) is the solution at the current iteration and vold(i) is
the solution at the last iteration.
(a) If (4.6) is satisfied, then end the iterative procedure and output the optimal
solution
(b) If (4.6) is not satisfied, then go back to step 2.
Lets now consider the following example for the case where N = 2 from Sethi and
Thompson [22].
Example 4.1.1 (Bilinear Quadratic Advertising Model). We consider a simple adver-
tising competition game between Firm i for i = 1, 2 where,
xi(t) = the market share Firm i has at time t
and for the controls, at each time t, an advertising rate is implemented by each of the
firms. So the controls for our problem are defined as:
ui(t) = advertising rate Firm i at time t
and also the following parameters are defined as:
ai = ineffectiveness of Firm i’s advertising strategy
bi = effectiveness of Firm i’s advertising strategy
ci = cost of Firm i’s advertising
wi = Firm i’s wealth
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We have the following system with dynamics
ẋ1(t) = b1u1(t)(1− x1(t)− x2(t))− a1x1(t),
x1(0) = x10, t ∈ [0, T ],
(4.7)
and
ẋ2(t) = b2u2(t)(1− x1(t)− x2(t))− a2x2(t),
x2(0) = x20, t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.8)







dt+ wixi(T ). (4.9)
where bi, ai, wi, ci, and r are positive constants. We aim to find the necessary condi-
tions for the open-loop Nash Equilibrium.
Solution. The Hamiltonian for each of the firms are
H1(t, x1, x2, u1, u2, p11, p12) = p11(b1u1(1− x1 − x2)− a1x1) + c1x1 − u21
+p12(b2u2(1− x1 − x2)− a2x2),
(4.10)
and
H2(t, x1, x2, u1, u2, p21, p22) = p21(b1u1(1− x1 − x2)− a1x1) + c2x2 − u22
+p22(b2u2(1− x1 − x2)− a2x2),
(4.11)
where the adjoint variables for each of firms are denoted as p11, p12, p21, p22.
Applying the maximum principle
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We obtain the following necessary conditions for optimization.
u∗1 = argmax
u1≥0
{H1(t, x∗1, x∗2, u∗1, u∗2, p11, p12)}
=





{H2(t, x∗1, x∗2, u∗1, u∗2, p21, p22)}
=









1(1− x∗1 − x∗2)
2
− a1x∗1, x1(0) = x10,
ẋ∗2 = b2u
∗




2(1− x∗1 − x∗2)
2
− a2x∗2, x2(0) = x20,
ṗ∗11 = −∇x1H1(t, x∗1, x∗2, u∗1, u∗2, p11, p12)
= p11b1u
∗













+ p11a1 − c1, p11(T ) = w1,
















− a2p12, p12(T ) = 0,


















+ p21a1, p21(T ) = 0,





2 + p22a2 − c2
=











+ p22a2 − c2, p22(T ) = w2.
We will use the values of x1(0) = 0.45 and x2(0) = 0.35 for the initial condition,
a1 = 0.25, a2 = 0.65, b1 = 0.75, b2 = 0.35, c1 = c2 = 1, for the constants, T = 1 for the
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terminal time, N = 1000 for the number of subintervals and ε = 0.001 for the tolerance
to solve the problem numerically.
Hence using Algorithm 4.1.1 we obtain the following graphical results given by Figure
4.1 - 4.4
Figure 4.1: Optimal Controls u∗1(t) and u
∗
2(t) for Example 4.1.1
In Figure 4.1 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the control for Example
4.1.1. For this example the control ui represented the advertising rate of its respective
Firm at time t. From Figure 4.5 we see that the market share for both firms increases,
reaches some turning point and then decreases. Also we see that Firm 1 has a greater
advertising rate than Firm 2 on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 4.2: Optimal States x∗1(t) and x
∗
2(t) for Example 4.1.1
In Figure 4.2 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the state for Example
4.1.1. For this example the state xi represented the market share of its respective Firm at
time t. From Figure 4.2 we see that the market share for both of the firms is decreasing.
Also we see that Firm 1 has a greater market share than Firm 2 on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].






22(t) for Example 4.1.1
In Figure 4.3 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the adjoint for Example
4.1.1. The adjoint here represents the marginal value of the market share. In other
words, the adjoint for this example is the rate of change in the payoff for small changes
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in the market share. From Figure 4.3 we see that for Firm 1, p11 decreases whilst p12
increases and for Firm 2, p21 increases whilst p22 decreases on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 4.4: Optimal Payoffs J∗1 (t) and J
∗
2 (t) for Example 4.1.1
In Figure 4.4 we present the approximated optimal solution of the payoff functions J∗1 (t)
and J∗2 (t) for Example 4.1.1. From Figure 4.4 we see that the value of the final payoffs
are given as J∗1 (t) = 0.77158 and J
∗
2 (t) = 0.44389. Also from Figure 4.4 we see that
Firm 1 has a greater payoff than Firm 2 on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].

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ẋ = u]1(1− x)− u
]
2x, x(0) = x0,




2)− φ1 λ1(T ) = δ11 − δ12
δ11 x(T ) = 0, δ12 (1− x(T )) = 0,
δ11 ≥ 0, δ12 ≥ 0,




2) + φ2, λ2(T ) = δ21 − δ22,
δ21 x(T ) = 0, δ22 (1− x(T )) = 0,
δ21 ≥ 0, δ22 ≥ 0.
(4.12)
for all u1, u2 which satisfy the constraints
u1(1− x)− u2x ≥ 0,
u2x− u1(1− x) ≥ 0.
(4.13)
and the slackness conditions
ν11 x = 0, ν12 (1− x) = 0,
ν21 x = 0, ν22 (1− x) = 0,
ν11 ≥ 0, ν12 ≥ 0, ν21 ≥ 0, ν22 ≥ 0,
˙ν11 ≤ 0, ˙ν12 ≤ 0, ˙ν21 ≤ 0, ˙ν22 ≤ 0.
(4.14)
We will use the values of x(0) = 0.45 for the initial condition, k1 = k2 = 1, r1 =
0.09, r2 = 0.08, φ1 = φ2 = 0.5, for the constants, interest rates and fractional revenues,
T = 1 for the terminal time, N = 1000 for the number of subintervals and ε = 0.001 for
the tolerance to solve the problem numerically using Algorithm 4.1.1.
Solution. Hence using Algorithm 4.1.1 we obtain the following graphical results given
by Figure 4.5 - 4.9
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Figure 4.5: Optimal Controls u∗1(t) and u
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.2
In Figure 4.5 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the control for Example
3.1.2. For this example the control ui represented the advertising effort of its respective
Firm at time t. From Figure 4.5 we see that the advertising effort of both firms is
decreasing. Also we see that Firm 1 has a greater advertising effort than Firm 2 over
the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 4.6: Optimal State x∗(t) for Example 3.1.2
In Figure 4.6 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the state for Example
3.1.2. For this example the state xi represented the market share of its respective Firm
at time t. From Figure 4.6 we see that the market share for Firm 1 increases whilst the
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market share for Firm 2 decreases. Also we see that Firm 2 has a greater market share
than Firm 1 over the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 4.7: Optimal Adjoints λ∗1(t) and λ
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.2
In Figure 4.7 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the adjoint for Example
3.1.2. The adjoint here represents the marginal value of the market share. In other
words, the adjoint for this example is the rate of change in the payoff for small changes
in the market share. From Figure 4.7 we see that for Firm 1, λ1 decreases whilst for
Firm 2, λ2 increases on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 4.8: Optimal Lagrange Multipliers ν∗1 (t) and ν
∗
2 (t) for Example 3.1.2
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In Figure 4.8 we present the approximated optimal solution of the Lagrange multipliers
ν∗1(t) and ν
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.2. For simplicity, when solving this example we let the
multiplier ν1 = ν11 − ν12 and ν2 = ν21 − ν22. The multiplier for this example is the rate
of change in the payoff for small changes in the pure state constraint. From Figure 4.8
we see that ν1 = ν2 = 0.
Figure 4.9: Optimal Payoffs J∗1 (t) and J
∗
2 (t) for Example 3.1.2
In Figure 4.9 we present the approximated optimal solution of the payoff functions J∗1 (t)
and J∗2 (t) for Example 3.1.2. From Figure 4.9 we see that the value of the final payoffs
are given as J∗1 (t) = 0.21274 and J
∗
2 (t) = 0.25035. Also from Figure 4.9 we see that
Firm 2 has a greater payoff than Firm 1 on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].

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Example 4.1.3. Recall that previously the solution of Example 3.1.1 was found to satisfy

u]1 = −p1 · x,
u]2 =
1
(x · (1− p2))2
,
ẋ = x(u]2 − u
]
1), x(0) = x0,






2, p1(T ) = δ1
δ1 x(T ) = 0,
δ1 ≥ 0,






2, p2(T ) = δ2,
δ2 x(T ) = 0,
δ2 ≥ 0.
(4.15)
which satisfy the slackness conditions µ1 ≥ 0, µ1 x = 0, µ̇1 ≤ 0,µ2 ≥ 0, µ2 x = 0, µ̇2 ≤ 0. (4.16)
to determine the state x and the adjoint variables p1 and p2.
We will use the values of x(0) = 1, T = 1, N = 1000 and ε = 0.001 for the initial
condition, terminal time, number of subintervals and tolerance respectively to solve the
problem numerically using Algorithm 4.1.1.
Solution. Hence using Algorithm 4.1.1 we obtain the following graphical results given
by Figure 4.10 - 4.14
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Figure 4.10: Optimal Controls u∗1(t) and u
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.1
In Figure 4.10 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the control for Example
3.1.1. For this example the control u1 and u2 represented the production and consump-
tion rates respectively. From Figure 4.10 we see that the rate of production is increasing
whilst the rate of consumption is decreasing. Also we see that the rate of consumption
is greater than the rate of production over the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 4.11: Optimal State x∗(t) for Example 3.1.1
In Figure 4.11 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the state for Example
3.1.1. For this example the state x represented the sale price. From Figure 4.11 we see
that the sale price is increasing on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 4.12: Optimal Adjoints λ∗1(t) and λ
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.1
In Figure 4.12 we present the approximated optimal solutions of the adjoint for Example
3.1.1. The adjoint here represents the marginal value of the sale price. In other words,
the adjoint for this example is the rate of change in the payoff for small changes in the
sale price. From Figure 4.12 we see that for the producer, λ1 decreases whilst for the
consumer, λ2 increases on the interval t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 4.13: Optimal Lagrange Multipliers µ∗1(t) and µ
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.1
In Figure 4.13 we present the approximated optimal solution of the Lagrange multipliers
µ∗1(t) and µ
∗
2(t) for Example 3.1.1. The multiplier for this example is the rate of change
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in the payoff for small changes in the pure state constraint. From Figure 4.13 we see
that µ1 = µ2 = 0.
Figure 4.14: Optimal Payoffs J∗1 (t) and J
∗
2 (t) for Example 3.1.1
In Figure 4.14 we present the approximated optimal solution of the payoff functions
J∗1 (t) and J
∗
2 (t) for Example 3.1.1. From Figure 4.14 we see that the value of the final
payoffs are given as J∗1 (t) = 0.45188 and J
∗
2 (t) = 0.68441. Also from Figure 4.4 we see




This dissertation successfully obtained open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solu-
tions for anN -player differential game with pure state constraints by using an application
of the maximum principle.
In solving for an open-loop Nash equilibrium, an application of the maximum principle
yielded a set of necessary conditions for the solution. By assuming concavity and con-
vexity of the appropriate functions and sets, we were able to get sufficient conditions
for an existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution. However, in practice there
may be situations where these concavity and convexity assumptions fail, and hence the
solutions may not be optimal.
Also for an open-loop Nash Equilibrium to exist, every player has to be able to deduce
the equilibrium strategies for themselves and their opponents. In practice, these players
can be people, animals, or computer programs. As a result there is a possibility of human
error, mistakes or technical malfunctions while implementing a strategy, and hence the
game will involve some uncertainty.
A possible solution to the above problems for the open-loop Nash equilibriums would
be to introduce the notion of a randomized strategy to the two player differential game.
By adding the element of probability to the strategies, we obtain a class of differential
games known as stochastic differential games. For this class of differential games, we
will obtain a more general existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium. The theory of
stochastic differential games provides us with the first possible area for future work in
differential games.
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Another shortcoming of an open-loop Nash equilibrium is that it’s possible for a game to
have multiple equilibrium solutions. Sufficient conditions guarantee that an equilibrium
solution exists but the players might not know which solution they should focus on. A
remedy to this problem would be to allow the players to communicate with each other
so that they can choose an equilibrium through negotiation. This leads us to a class
games known as cooperative differential games, providing us with the second possible
area for future work in differential games.
In solving for the necessary conditions of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, we used a
combination of variational calculus and the application of the maximum principle. Here,
we first found a set of necessary conditions for the follower and then for the leader. In
order to solve for this equilibrium solution, we had assumed that the roles of the players
remained fixed at the beginning of the game. However, in practice this is not always the
case. It is not always of a players best interest to remain the leader, or alternatively the
follower of the game. Also, there are situations in which being the leader may be of best
interest to both of the players or alternatively to none of them. There are also situations
that may arise in which the roles of the players are not clear. A possible solution to this
leadership problem would be to introduce the notion of a mixed leadership differential
game as in Başar et al [41]. The theory of mixed leadership differential games provides
us with the third possible area for future work in differential games.
Also in solving for the necessary conditions of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, we
had focused on a game situation with a single leader and follower. In practice, there are
many differential game situations where there are multiple leaders and followers. Hence
an extension of the theory to solve for an an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium with
multiple leaders and followers may be the fourth possible area for future work.
In solving an N -player differential game problem completely we had to adopt the use of
computer techniques and numerical methods. We successfully described and illustrated
a numerical algorithm for solving for an open-loop Nash equilibrium, but failed to do
so for an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. This paves the way for the fifth area for
future work in the sense that we can apply numerical methods to solve for an open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium of an N -player differential differential game.
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